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Germany’s	election:	Behind	consensus	politics	lie
conflicting	ideas	of	Europe
Ahead	of	the	24	September	German	federal	elections,	Angela	Merkel	and
the	CDU/CSU	are	leading	by	a	wide	margin,	although	the	number	of
undecided	voters	is	still	high.	Annette	Bongardt,	Lorenzo	Codogno	and
Francisco	Torres	write	that	although	Europe	has	been	relatively	absent
from	the	electoral	debate,	there	is	a	clash	between	two	different	visions:
further	integration	by	strengthening	European	institutions,	and	gradual
integration	by	making	the	Union	even	more	inter-governmental,	with	a	de-politicised	Commission	and	a
transformed	European	Stability	Mechanism.	Contrary	to	the	perception	that	German	elections	are	‘boring’,	there
is	a	lot	at	stake	for	the	future	of	Europe.
Angela	Merkel	and	Martin	Schulz	at	a	European	Council	meeting,	Credit:	European	Council	(CC	BY-NC-SA	2.0)
Many	commentators	have	pointed	to	the	uneventful	campaign	and	the	lack	of	interest	in	the	24	September
federal	elections	in	Germany,	but	their	outcome	could	potentially	result	in	important	changes	for	the	EU	and	the
Eurozone.	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel	and	the	CDU/CSU	are	leading	in	opinion	polls	by	a	wide	margin,	and	her
fourth	mandate	as	German	Chancellor	seems	a	foregone	conclusion.
How	significant	will	the	change	in	policy	be?	There	are	two	primary	variables	to	watch:	(1)	the	coalition	that	will
emerge	from	the	poll	and	(2)	how	the	junior	party	(or	parties)	in	the	coalition	will	weigh	on	the	role	of	the	Finance
Minister,	a	position	that	is	key	for	future	policies	towards	Europe.
Four	possible	options
Recent	opinion	polls	suggest	a	13-17	percentage	point	lead	for	Merkel	(37-39%	for	Merkel’s	CDU/CSU	vs	23-
24%	for	the	Social	Democrats).	The	FDP	is	at	about	8-9%	(they	failed	to	reach	the	5%	threshold	in	2013,	and
they	are	currently	not	in	Parliament).	The	Greens	are	at	about	7-8%	and	the	far-left	Die	Linke	is	around	9-10%.
Most	probably,	the	far-right	AfD	will	pass	the	“five	percent	hurdle”	and	enter	Parliament,	but	they	would	be	out	of
any	alliance.	Six	parties	are	likely	to	gain	access	to	Parliament	as	opposed	to	just	four	currently.
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Considering	that	some	smaller	parties	are	not	going	to	be	represented	and	their	votes	are	to	be	redistributed,
about	48%	of	the	votes	may	be	sufficient	to	get	an	outright	majority	of	seats	in	Parliament,	giving	four	possible
options	depending	on	where	the	decimal	points	fall	and	on	Merkel’s	decision.
A	re-run	of	the	Grand	Coalition	between	the	CDU/CSU	and	the	SPD
A	Grand	Coalition	might	well	be	Merkel’s	preferred	result,	not	to	become	hostage	to	both	the	CSU	and	the	FDP	in
European	affairs	(but	also	on	migration,	energy	and	climate	policies).	However,	if	the	CDU/CSU	manages	to	have
a	majority	with	the	FDP	it	will	be	very	difficult	not	to	dump	the	SPD,	as	it	would	be	difficult	to	convince	both	the
CSU	and	part	of	her	own	party.
If	the	CDU/CSU	becomes	dependent	on	the	SPD	to	form	a	governing	coalition	(that	is,	it	does	not	reach	the
numbers	to	form	a	coalition	with	the	FDP	and/or	with	the	Greens),	the	SPD	may	ask	for	the	Ministry	of	Finance
instead	of	the	Foreign	Ministry	(which	they	got	last	time).	Martin	Schulz,	the	former	president	of	the	European
Parliament	and	current	leader	of	the	party,	or	Sigmar	Gabriel,	the	current	Vice	Chancellor	and	Minister	for
Economic	Affairs	and	Energy	and	former	leader	of	the	party,	could	become	Finance	Minister	(some	people	also
say	that	Olaf	Scholz,	the	mayor	of	Hamburg,	could	be	in	the	game).	It	would	represent	an	important	shift	in	policy
towards	faster	and	deeper	European	integration	versus	the	current	approach	designed	by	Wolfgang	Schäuble.
Still,	Angela	Merkel	might	resist	those	demands	and	convince	the	SPD	to	remain	with	the	current	portfolios.
Martin	Schulz,	who	is	very	close	to	Jean-Claude	Juncker,	the	President	of	the	European	Commission,	is
considered	a	passionate	EU	supporter.	He	would	also	work	very	well	with	Angela	Merkel.	More	importantly,
Schulz	is	committed	to	strengthening	Europe	and	European	institutions.	In	2016,	he	proposed	a	ten-point	plan	for
reforming	the	EU.	The	plan	calls	for	a	streamlining	of	European	institutions	and	the	formation	of	a	strong
European	government,	which	would	be	more	tightly	controlled	by	the	European	Parliament.	It	would	be	a
significant	departure	from	the	policies	followed	so	far	by	Wolfgang	Schäuble,	who	enjoyed	lots	of	independence
even	from	Angela	Merkel	and	his	party.	Even	without	the	finance	ministry,	Schulz	would	have	a	strong	impact	in
rebalancing	the	government	towards	a	more	integrationist/federalist	stance,	especially	so	with	Macron	in	France.
The	so-called	Jamaica	coalition	(CDU/CSU,	FDP,	and	the	Greens)
This	would	be	a	novelty	for	Germany.	These	three	parties	(actually	four,	as	the	CDU	and	CSU	are	two	different
parties)	have	never	been	in	power	together	at	the	national	level.	They	seem	sufficiently	close,	however,	regarding
policies.	Probably	the	most	tricky	bit	would	be	combining	the	somewhat	Eurosceptic	views	of	the	FDP	with	the
strongly	pro-European	stance	of	the	Greens.	On	many	other	issues	(namely	on	migration,	energy	and	climate
policies),	the	FDP	would	tend	to	team	up	with	the	CSU	and	part	of	the	CDU	against	Merkel	and	the	Greens.	This
coalition	would	have	a	sufficiently	vast	majority	in	the	Bundestag,	although	in	the	Bundesrat,	the	chamber	formed
by	representatives	from	the	Länder,	there	may	still	be	some	problems.
At	the	local	level,	there	are	grand	coalitions	and	if	the	SPD	does	not	agree	with	policies	at	the	national	level,	the
representative	of	the	State	would	have	to	abstain	in	the	Bundesrat.	The	German	legislative	process	often	requires
the	agreement	of	the	Bundesrat	on	several	matters,	including	those	related	to	Europe.	In	fact,	federal	legislation
frequently	has	to	be	executed	by	state	or	local	agencies.	Parties	are	used	to	forming	a	conciliatory	committee	to
find	a	compromise	when	there	is	disagreement	between	the	Bundestag	and	the	Bundesrat.
No	matter	how	it	goes,	the	consensus	way	of	conducting	policies	is	unlikely	to	change	much	in	Germany,	and	this
includes	policies	toward	Europe.	Still,	in	many	policy	areas,	there	may	indeed	be	change.	If	tradition	holds,	which
seems	likely,	as	there	is	always	the	alternative	option	of	a	grand	coalition	with	the	SPD	–	the	FDP	would	stay	with
the	Economics	and/or	Foreign	Affairs	ministries.	Thus,	Wolfgang	Schäuble	would	remain	finance	minister.	The
FDP’s	leader,	Christian	Lindner	(38),	would	normally	opt	for	the	Foreign	Ministry	(as	Guido	Westerwelle	did	in	the
2009-2013	political	term)	or	the	Economics	Ministry.
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The	Greens	are	more	inclined	to	ask	for	ministries	that	deal	with	energy,	the	environment,	and	family	matters.
However,	if	they	were	to	be	in	government	with	the	CDU/CSU	and	the	FDP,	it	would	be	unlikely	that	the	FDP
would	get	both	the	Economics	and	Foreign	Affairs	ministries	as	the	Greens	would	ask	to	have	Foreign	Affairs
(like	Joschka	Fischer	in	the	SPD-Green	coalition).	In	the	case	of	a	Jamaica	coalition,	there	would	still	be	a
significant	chance	that	Wolfgang	Schäuble	gets	the	job	again	and	thus	informs	policies	towards	Europe.
CDU/CSU	and	the	FDP	(black/yellow)
If	the	SPD	does	not	perform	sufficiently	well	on	24	September	to	impede	the	CDU/CSU	and	FDP	from	getting	a
majority	in	Parliament,	this	would	lead	to	a	traditional	Black-Yellow	alliance.	On	paper,	this	seems	the	most
cohesive	coalition,	but	many	in	the	CDU/CSU,	especially	Angela	Merkel,	would	not	like	to	be	so	dependent	on	a
small	party	like	the	FDP,	with	which	it	had	important	frictions	in	2009-2013	and	whose	stance	on	Europe,
migration	and	energy/climate	issues	diverges	from	the	current	government	and	also	from	Merkel	and	at	least	part
of	the	CDU’s	stance.
In	such	a	scenario,	most	probably	Wolfgang	Schäuble	would	remain	finance	minister.	If	a	Black-Yellow	coalition
were	technically	feasible,	it	would	be	difficult	for	the	two	parties	not	to	go	for	that,	given	the	long	tradition	and	the
relatively	close	political	positions	between	these	two	political	forces.	Still,	today’s	FDP	is	not	the	same	as
Genscher’s	or	Lambsdorff’s	and	its	positions	on	Europe,	migration,	the	automobile	industry	or	energy	and	climate
change	have	headed	towards	a	less	open	and	liberal	and	a	more	protectionist	and	Eurosceptic	stance.	It	is	also
much	less	programmatic	(principle-based)	and	it	has	run	the	campaign	to	re-enter	Parliament	as	a	one-man
show,	which	makes	it	less	predictable.
A	black/green	coalition?
This	seems	not	a	very	likely	scenario,	although	still	a	possible	one	if	the	Greens	enjoy	a	better	result	than	the
FDP.	The	FDP	and	not	the	Greens	are	by	tradition	the	first	choice	of	the	CDU/CSU	and	possibly	the	CSU	would
object	to	the	Greens	as	the	only	coalition	partner	(they	are	much	closer	to	Merkel’s	choices	and	ambitions	for	her
most	likely	last	mandate).	Therefore,	a	Jamaica	coalition	seems	more	likely	than	this	option.
Will	German	fiscal	policy	become	more	expansionary?
In	Germany,	strict	adherence	to	the	internal	debt	brake	rule,	i.e.	the	so-called	“black-zero”,	limits	the	room	for
expansionary	policies	and	for	a	stance	that	takes	into	account	the	rest	of	the	Eurozone.	With	Mr	Schäuble
remaining	at	the	head	of	the	Finance	Ministry,	very	little	would	change.
How	would	it	change	with	other	Ministers	or	other	coalitions?	The	short	answer	is	not	much.	The	national	debt-
brake	rule	enjoys	a	close-to-80%	support	rate	among	voters,	and	as	a	result,	European	rules	are	also	held	in	high
regard	to	the	point	that	no	future	German	government	would	dare	to	propose	any	change.	At	the	national	level,	it
would	take	a	two-thirds	majority	in	Parliament	to	change	the	fiscal	rules,	which	is	a	close-to-impossible	outcome.
Germany	has	resisted	calls	for	a	more	expansionary	economic	policy	to	rebalance	its	external	accounts	(about
8.5%	of	GDP).	The	in-depth	review	of	the	Commission	conducted	in	February	2017	led	it	to	conclude	that
Germany	is	experiencing	macroeconomic	imbalances.
The	assessment	of	the	need	for	public	investment,	especially	in	light	of	the	close-to-zero	financing	cost,	is
changing	and	there	is	now	some	recognition	that	a	higher	level	of	public	investment	would	make	sense	but	not	at
the	expense	of	fiscal	discipline.	There	is	already	some	increase	in	spending	on	infrastructure,	but	coming	from
years	of	cuts.
There	is	also	a	broad	call	for	more	public	spending	at	the	local	level.	Schäuble	keeps	saying	that	states	are	not
even	able	to	spend	the	funds	already	available	and	Merkel	has	argued	that	the	biggest	obstacle	to	spending	on
infrastructure	is	not	lack	of	proper	funding	but	bottlenecks	in	planning	and	institutional	capacity	to	handle	big
projects.	The	CDU/CSU	has	promised	to	reduce	red	tape,	ease	planning	restrictions	and	introduce	a	fast	track	for
major	priority	investment	projects.	Merkel	has	also	promised	some	small	‘treats’	in	the	form	of	tax	cuts	for
households,	on	top	of	more	spending	on	defence.	There	is	no	commitment	on	liberalising	services.	Schulz	has
promised	some	redistribution	of	the	personal	income	burden.
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However,	despite	these	plans,	a	significant	change	in	attitude	towards	the	external	primary	surplus	or	a	more
convincing	stimulus	to	domestic	demand	seems	unlikely	no	matter	which	coalition	and	Minister	emerges	from	the
polls.	A	short-term	stimulus	to	demand	would	not	do	much	to	address	the	underlying	current	account	imbalances
–	i.e.	the	imbalances	between	domestic	savings	and	domestic	investments	–	but	there	seems	to	be	no	plan	to
deal	with	the	issue	from	the	structural	side	either.
Would	the	new	German	government	re-launch	the	European	project?
There	are	high	expectations	of	a	new	drive	towards	European	integration	in	the	aftermath	of	the	German
elections,	and	EU	governance	is	probably	the	area	where	the	SPD,	especially	an	SPD	led	by	Schulz,	would	tilt
the	balance	in	favour	of	further	European	integration.	President	Macron	in	France	is	proposing	a	fresh	new
season	for	the	European	project.	However,	the	roadmap	presented	by	the	Four	and	then	the	Five	Presidents	has
been	met	with	a	lukewarm	reception,	if	not	outright	opposition,	in	Germany.
Germany	has	opposed	any	mutualisation	of	fiscal	policies	or	fiscal	transfers,	let	alone	any	Eurobonds	or
mutualisation	of	government	liabilities	and	any	step	towards	completing	the	banking	union	with	a	European
deposit	insurance.	There	has	been	strong	opposition	towards	any	European	unemployment	insurance	as	well.
Finally,	there	has	been	increasing	criticism	of	European	institutions.	Is	all	this	going	to	change?
Recently,	Angela	Merkel	and	Wolfgang	Schäuble	indicated	cautious	support	for	Macron’s	ideas	and	made	some
substantial	overtures	for	an	expanded	role	of	the	European	Stability	Mechanism	(ESM).	The	ESM	would
effectively	become	a	sort	of	European	Monetary	Fund	(EMF),	allowing	countries	to	call	on	the	fund	for
countercyclical	investment	and	the	costs	of	natural	disasters,	and	with	some	capacity	to	issue	debt.	In	the
traditional	annual	meeting	with	the	press,	Schäuble	announced	a	proposal	that	will	be	unveiled	after	the	elections.
The	FDP	is	not	keen	to	speed	up	integration	either.	The	current	FDP	leader,	Christian	Lindner,	resigned	from	the
position	of	secretary	general	of	the	party	in	December	2011.	A	group	of	Eurosceptic	FDP	parliamentarians	forced
his	resignation	on	the	future	course	of	the	ESM.	Therefore,	any	plan	to	go	towards	a	strengthening	of	the	ESM
and	its	transformation	into	an	EMF	may	find	some	opposition	in	the	FDP	and	probably	in	part	of	the	CDU/CSU	as
well.	In	the	past,	Germany	was	in	favour	of	a	semi-automatic	mechanism	for	sovereign	debt	restructuring	in	the
Eurozone,	designed	to	prevent	any	form	of	risk	sharing	among	its	countries,	as	well	as	tools	to	reduce	risk,	and	it
is	unclear	whether	this	would	be	part	of	the	ticket	that	makes	the	proposal	more	palatable	for	some	sceptic
voices.
What	are	Schäuble’s	plans?
Although	there	are	no	details,	it	is	not	difficult	to	imagine	the	direction	of	travel	of	Germany	under	the	guidance	of
Mr	Schäuble.	The	idea	is	clearly	to	proceed	towards	European	integration	with	a	more	intergovernmental
approach	by	weakening	European	institutions	such	as	the	Commission	and,	by	doing	so,	also	the	European
Parliament.	It	would	imply	the	shift	of	responsibility	for	surveillance	of	public	finances	from	the	Commission	to	the
EMF.	The	EMF	would	take	power	away	from	the	Commission,	which	is	not	seen	as	an	impartial	arbiter,	and	from
the	IMF,	which	is	too	distant	and	not	controlled	by	Europeans.
The	EMF	would	take	on	board	a	greater	role	in	supervising	fiscal	policy	of	the	Member	States	and	a	greater	say
in	debt	restructuring.	The	objective	is	to	“make	the	rules	more	credible”,	i.e.	if	the	Commission	is	not	willing	to	act
as	an	independent	institution	but	as	a	political	player	(as	the	Junker	Commission	has	vowed	to	do,	and	as	it	is
perceived	to	have	done	with	respect	to	the	management	of	the	Greek	crisis),	then	Germany	would	go	for	another
independent	institution,	i.e.	the	ESM/EMF.	Whether	this	is	entirely	compatible	with	the	Treaties	is	unclear,	but	it
may	well	be.
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Effectively,	the	financial	endowment	of	the	fund	would	come	in	exchange	for	stronger	incentives	for	fiscal
discipline.	It	could	be	done	by	simply	modifying	the	ESM	Treaty,	which	is	an	intergovernmental	treaty	and	thus
much	easier	to	change.	The	new	ESM	(or	EMF)	would	also	have	the	role	of	intervening	in	support	of	countries	in
difficulty	such	as	Greece.	The	governance	of	the	ESM	requires	unanimity	(mutual	consent)	on	many	issues
(decisions	to	provide	stability	support	to	an	ESM	Member,	the	choice	of	instruments,	and	conditions	and	terms	of
such	support).	In	some	other	areas,	the	Board	of	Governors	of	the	ESM	takes	decisions	by	a	qualified	majority
defined	in	the	ESM	Treaty	as	80%	of	the	votes	cast,	with	voting	rights	equal	to	the	number	of	shares	allocated	to
each	country.	The	German	Parliament	and	the	German	Constitutional	Court	would	have	a	de-facto	veto	power
over	the	most	important	decisions,	which	is	currently	not	guaranteed	by	the	collegial	and	political	approach	of	the
Commission.
Of	course,	this	German	view	must	be	made	compatible	with	the	opinion	of	France.	Germany	knows	that	Macron
needs	to	be	supported	and	granted	some	important	concessions	if	he	is	to	successfully	reform	his	country.	One
such	concession	would	be	to	have	a	European	finance	minister,	who	could	respond	to	the	European	Parliament.
Also	the	Eurogroup	could	eventually	be	turned	into	a	Council	configuration.	Such	institutional	changes	(which	will
be	easier	to	enact	without	the	UK	in	the	EU)	would	enhance	the	involvement	of	the	European	Parliament	and	the
democratic	accountability	for	the	decisions	taken	for	or	on	behalf	of	the	euro	area	as	suggested	by	the
Commission’s	reflection	paper	on	EMU.
Therefore,	this	German	view	can	be	shaped	to	the	needs	of	France	(while	all	other	countries	seem	out	of	this
game,	although	eventually,	they	would	have	to	agree	as	well).	Incidentally,	the	Italian	suggestion	to	have	the
seats	of	British	MEPs	occupied	by	pan-European	lists	has	just	received	the	support	of	France.	Moreover,	both
Merkel	and	Schäuble	will	want	to	leave	their	mark	on	the	European	integration	process	and	therefore	might	use
their	last	mandate	not	only	to	safeguard	Germany’s	national	(and	short	term)	interests	but	finally	to	advance	it,
with	much	less	electoral	pressure,	in	the	common	and	German	long	term	interest.
Bottom	line:	The	2017	German	elections	are	an	important	event	for	both	Germany	and	Europe
For	Europe,	there	is	much	more	than	meets	the	eye	in	German	elections.	It	will	determine	the	course	of	European
integration,	with	a	clash	between	two	different	visions:	further	integration	by	strengthening	European	institutions
(Schulz)	and	gradual	integration	by	making	the	Union	even	more	inter-governmental,	with	a	de-politicised
Commission	and	a	transformation	of	the	ESM	(Merkel-Schäuble)	with	more	responsibility	on	fiscal	surveillance.
However,	Merkel/Schäuble	have	made	some	openings	toward	a	possible	Eurozone	Finance	Minister	and	some
fiscal	capacity.
If	everything	goes	smoothly,	Germany	will	likely	have	a	new	government	by	the	end	of	October,	but	it	will	take	a
few	more	weeks	to	get	everything	up-and-running	in	the	various	ministries.	Therefore,	the	expectation	that
Germany	will	be	ready	to	discuss	the	future	of	Europe	with	France	and	other	countries	at	the	summit	scheduled
for	October	are	probably	over-optimistic.	More	likely,	a	comprehensive	negotiation	on	the	future	of	Europe	will
start	early	next	year	and	will	probably	produce	some	outcomes	by	the	summer	of	2018.	The	final	approval	may
not	happen	before	the	European	Parliament	elections	in	the	spring	of	2019.
Negotiations	will	encompass	all	open	issues,	probably	including	also	the	banking	union	and	the	appointment	of
the	president	of	the	ECB.	Therefore,	the	picture	that	will	emerge	from	the	polls	on	24	September	will	be	far	from	a
still	life	painting.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	of
the	London	School	of	Economics.
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